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Recent evidence suggests that the default options implicit in economic choices (e.g., 401(k) savings
by white-collar workers) have extraordinarily large effects on decision-making. This study presents
a field experiment that evaluates the effect of defaults on savings among a highly policy-relevant population:
low-income tax filers. In the control condition, tax filers could choose (i.e., opt in) to receive some
of their federal tax refund in the form of U.S. Savings Bonds. In the treatment condition, a fraction
of the tax refund was automatically directed to U.S. Savings Bonds unless tax filers actively chose
another allocation. We find that the opt-out default had no impact on savings behavior. Furthermore,
our treatment estimate is sufficiently precise to reject effects as small as one-fifth of the participation
effects found in the 401(k) literature. Ancillary evidence suggests that this "nudge" was ineffective
in part because the low-income tax filers in our study had targeted plans to spend their refunds. These
results suggest that choice architecture based on defaults may be less effective in certain policy-relevant
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Manipulating the status quo implicit in economic decisions (i.e., the default) is widely
viewed as one of the most robust and inuential tools in the arsenal of \nudges" (Camerer et
al., 2003). Defaults have been shown to have meaningful impacts on a number of individual
decisions ranging from organ donation (Abadie and Gay, 2000; Johnson and Goldstein, 2003)
to 401(k) contributions (Madrian and Shea, 2001), where the evidence suggests extraordi-
narily large eects of defaults on savings decisions. The results from these studies are often
assumed to generalize to other settings and populations, especially low-income populations
(see Bertrand et al., 2006). However, the extant literature provides no evidence on how
defaults aect savings behavior, outside of the population of 401(k) holders.1 This paper
presents the results of a eld experiment designed to evaluate whether a default manipulation
can aect low-income households' decisions to save with their tax refunds.
Policies designed to encourage savings in this population (i.e., low-income households)
have often focused specically on the propitious \savable moment" thought to exist in tax
return settings (e.g., Tufano, Schneider and Beverly, 2005). During the 2009 tax-ling sea-
son (IRS 2010), over 50 million tax returns reported adjusted gross income of $30,000 or
less but generated positive federal refunds (roughly half of all federal returns leading to re-
funds). Furthermore, these low-income lers received refunds that averaged approximately
$2,000. The widespread receipt of such large (but also somewhat uncertain and compara-
tively irregular) payments implies that low-income tax lers may be particularly responsive
to policy interventions that seek to promote savings. For example, an earlier study by Duo
et al. (2006) nd that matching grants lead to increased savings among low-income and
middle-income tax lers.
1 While previous studies have investigated how the impact of defaults on 401(k) participation varies
with income (Choi et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010), the lower bound income for such groups is
substantially larger than (approximately double) the mean income of our subject population.
2A recent savings innovation advocated by the Obama administration was clearly moti-
vated by the unique policy opportunities thought to exist in the \savable moment." Speci-
cally, during the 2010 tax-ling season, the IRS implemented new procedures that gave tax
lers the option to receive some or all of their refunds in the form of low-risk, relatively
liquid U.S. Series I Savings Bonds. In announcing this new policy, President Obama empha-
sized the potential impact of this new savings opportunity in promoting retirement security
(Andrews 2010). Advocates of this new policy underscored the role this savings opportunity
could play in the general asset development of low-income households. However, a previous
3-year pilot study of the program conducted at Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA)
sites found the take-up rate of U.S. Savings Bonds among low-income tax lers to be quite
low. Only about 6 percent of eligible tax lers (i.e., those who had positive refund amounts
and were using direct deposit to receive their refunds) purchased savings bonds with their
refunds (D2D Fund, Inc., 2009).
This study presents a eld experiment, conducted at eight Philadelphia-area VITA sites
during the 2010 tax-ling season, that asks whether introducing a default contribution of tax
refunds to U.S. Savings Bonds can increase participation in this new program. Specically,
we test whether presenting the option to direct some of one's refund to U.S. Savings Bonds
as an \opt-out" choice - where the default presumption is that some savings will occur -
increases the amount of bonds purchased relative to when the decision is presented as an
\opt-in" choice. Defaults like this have a potential advantage over policies like matching grant
interventions, in that they do not require nancial outlays. Furthermore, the prior literature
suggests that default manipulations should be especially powerful precisely for low-income
populations. For example, referring to the success of defaults \among the comfortable,"
Bertrand et al. (2006) state: \it seems safe to assume that defaults would have at least as
substantial an impact on the poor, whose options are inherently inferior, and who may be
3less informed about available alternatives." This argument draws on the idea that defaults
should have a stronger impact when decision costs are high, or information is limited, all
else equal (see, e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001). Consistent with this view, studies of 401(k)
holders nd that defaults are particularly eective among the lower-income individuals in
those populations (Choi et al., 2004; Beshears et al., 2010). However, the lower-bound
income of such 401(k) participants is substantially larger than the income of a substantial
fraction of the low-income tax lers receiving tax refunds. It is an open question how well
defaults may work among lower-income populations for whom the \savable moment" created
by tax refunds is most striking but who also face other pressing economic demands on their
resources. By randomly assigning tax lers to these two presentations of the decision to
purchase savings bonds with their refunds, we provide the rst empirical evidence as to the
eectiveness of a default manipulation to increase tax-time savings among this policy-relevant
population.
Consistent with the prior pilot data, we found that savings bond participation was fairly
low (i.e., roughly 9 percent among our control group) but plausibly related to several of the
observed traits of the lers (e.g., the tax refund size conditional on income). However, our
main nding is that random assignment to the default manipulation had no detectable eect
on the decision to allocate some of the tax refunds to U.S. Savings Bonds. Furthermore, our
impact estimates are suciently precise that we can reject participation eects as small as
one-fth of those found in default studies of 401(k) holders. We use both the available data
on the tax lers and an ex-post survey we conducted among the volunteer tax preparers who
participated in our study to examine the robustness of this nding as well as its possible
explanations. One prominent factor that could explain why the \nudge" was ineective was
the ex ante awareness among tax lers of the likelihood of receiving a large refund and the
strong intentions to spend those refunds. Many lers indicated having prior plans to spend
4the refund (as well as diculties paying bills), and tax preparers identied these plans to
spend as the leading explanation, when asked why they thought lers often actively resisted
the default. Indeed, to the extent that it conicted with strong intentions to do otherwise,
taking the savings default might have required considerable decision costs, eliminating the
decision-cost advantages usually associated with taking the default. This might be quite
dierent for the typical 401(k) holders, if they have a baseline intention to save and just
need the encouragement of a nudge to get them to make the decision.
We view these results as providing direct evidence on the challenges of designing policies
to encourage savings among low-income households. In particular, the ineectiveness of
a policy lever that has demonstrated such extraordinary ecacy in other settings raises
questions about the extent to which tax-ling settings really do constitute a savable moment
for the many low-income lers who receive large refunds. However, we also view our ndings
as providing novel { and more general - evidence on the potential limitations of policy
nudges for contexts where decision-makers have strong prior intentions. At the very least,
our ndings suggest that the broad eectiveness of such policies may depend crucially on
their design and on the populations and contexts in which they are applied. The paper
proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief review of the relevant literature on
defaults and savings decisions. Section 3 describes the policy innovation introduced during
the 2010 tax season, which allowed lers to direct some of their tax refunds to U.S. Savings
Bonds. Details of the experimental design and implementation are explained in Section 4.
In Section 5 we present the results of our experiment. Section 6 discusses our ndings and
their implications. Section 7 oers conclusions and some directions for future research.
52 Defaults and Economic Decision-Making
Neoclassical economics assumes rational economic agents will save when it is in their best
interest to do so. Behavioral economists, observing that many people make decisions that
are inconsistent with what perfect rationality would predict, recognize that it may take a
nudge to get people to act in their own best interest|in this case, to save. Exploiting status
quo bias through the use of defaults is one of the most appealing approaches to inuencing
behavior. Defaults are generally simple and inexpensive to implement and have the appeal
of simultaneously inuencing behavior without ultimately limiting choice. Considerable evi-
dence supports the success of defaults in increasing participation rates in retirement savings
through automatic enrollments (Beshears et al., 2008; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2002 and 2004).
Although manipulating the default has been shown to inuence behavior, defaults remain
a black box, with no widely accepted understanding of why and how they work. We briey
review several of the theoretical explanations for how defaults change behavior. Defaults may
oer an implicit or inferred expert recommendation (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Beshears, et
al., 2008)). As such, they reduce the complexity of the decision at hand (e.g., whether
or not to save and, if so, how much to save) and help decision makers overcome bounded
rationality from which they may suer (see, e.g., Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). In addition,
the implied recommendation increases an individual's condence in engaging in the behavior
under consideration. If the default is to participate in an employer's retirement savings
plan, it can be perceived as a recommendation from the employer, a recommendation to
which expert status is attributed. Accepting the default may also be reinforced by the fact
that acts of commission are psychologically more costly than acts of omission (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982). Deviating from the default can raise concerns about making a bad
decision and, consequently, suering regret. But by accepting the default, agents incur, at
6worst, costs associated with an error of omission (Choi et al., 2003). Next, depending on
the setting in which the decision is being made, agents may accept the default given that
they have the option to opt out later, although they may never exercise that option. The
default allows them to defer incurring the decision-making costs associated with actively
making a decision; this tendency to procrastinate is consistent with hyperbolic discounting
(O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Finally, defaults may work because decision makers are
not paying attention to the decision at hand; inattention leads to sticking with the default
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). This is most likely to be relevant regarding decisions
about which decision makers do not have strong preferences (Slovic, 1995).
The bulk of the evidence on the success of defaults in nancial settings is based on de-
cisions about 401(k) plans by the white collar, educated workers most likely to be oered
such plans. The default manipulations in this literature share a number of structural char-
acteristics. First, decision makers have the option to opt out of the default later. Even if
they never exercise that option, participants in a retirement savings program know that they
can actively choose to stop participating or lower the amount of their contributions. This
knowledge may make it easier to accept the default because acquiescence is not perceived as
being permanent or irreversible.
Second, the eects of the decision will (at least mostly) not be felt immediately. De-
faulting into a retirement savings account does mean foregoing some near term income, but
the implications of the decision are mostly experienced in the longer term. Defaulting into
a plan to save some portion of future earnings increases has eects that will only be felt
in the future. The experimental evidence showing that defaults work to increase savings is
primarily from settings in which the eect of the initial decision is largely deferred.
A third consideration is the size of the default. The typical default contribution rate in
the studies of successful 401(k) defaults is approximately 2 to 3 percent of income. However,
7a recent study by Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) examines retirement savings
at a single U.K. rm with an unusually high default contribution rate (i.e., 12 percent of
before-tax income). They nd that comparatively few employees (only 25 percent) remain
with this default and conclude that defaults are less powerful when linked to more extreme
decisions.2 This evidence suggests that the success of savings defaults may depend on the
default contribution being a relatively small percentage of income.
The evidence that nudges work in some settings is strong and provocative. However,
important questions remain unanswered regarding the exact mechanisms behind their ef-
fectiveness and what this might imply about the generalizability of default eects to other,
policy-relevant settings. How low-income tax lers might respond to defaults is of par-
ticular interest in light of the enthusiasm for leveraging the possibilities embedded in the
\savable moment." One reasonable conjecture is that defaults would be more eective in
a low-income population where decision-makers may have less complete information about
their alternatives (Bertrand et al. 2006). For example, low-income households may be
particularly responsive to the expert advice implicitly inferred from the presence of a de-
fault choice. However, low-income individuals also experience uniquely constrained economic
circumstances. Their economic needs could promote an awareness related to nancial re-
sources that makes them relatively unresponsive to the design eects of choice architecture.
Our research provides direct evidence on whether a default inuences the savings behavior of
low-income individuals and, indirectly, suggests the generalizability of nudges to important
new settings.
2 Even though most employees at this rm choose to opt out of the extreme default, they also nd
that most choose to stay with the default investment allocation, suggesting that the limited eect
of the default was not due to the study population aggressively managing their nances.
83 A Policy Innovation for the \Savable Moment"
On September 5th, 2009, President Obama announced several new initiatives designed
to increase individual retirement savings (Andrews, 2009). One of these initiatives { a new
IRS rule that would make it easier for small businesses to automatically enroll employees
in retirement plans { explicitly acknowledged the evidence that defaults can exert a major
inuence on savings decisions. A second, prominent feature of this retirement savings initia-
tive was the introduction of an option, beginning with the 2010 tax-ling season, by which
tax lers receiving federal refunds could use this money to purchase Series I U.S. Savings
Bonds through their tax returns. These bonds are available in denominations of $50, $100,
$200, $500, and $1,000, and they accrue interest, which is exempt from state and local but
not federal tax, for 30 years. The rate of return on Series I bonds is based on the ination
rate combined with a xed return. The purchase of a Series I bond implies some illiquidity.
In the rst 12 months of ownership, the bonds can only be redeemed under certain extreme
conditions (e.g., natural disasters). However, a bond that is cashed in within two to ve
years of purchase forfeits only 3 months of interest. Bond owners can redeem their bonds
without any penalty after ve years.
Though President Obama's announcement framed the new opportunity to direct tax
refunds to savings bonds around the promotion of retirement savings, advocates of this
reform emphasize the particular importance of this refund-based savings opportunity for low
to moderate income (LMI) families (e.g., Tufano and Schneider, 2005; Cramer et al., 2010).
One key motivation for the appeal of this policy is the claim that tax time constitutes
a unique \savable moment" in which LMI households can be more easily encouraged to
allocate some of their funds to savings. Because of tax policies like the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), LMI households often receive quite large, lump-sum federal tax refunds. For
9example, our study participants who are described below had an adjusted gross income under
$18,000 but received tax refunds of nearly $2,000 (Table 1). Behavioral economics suggests
that tax lers may adopt a mental accounting in which they view this large, infrequent, and
comparatively unpredictable income dierently than conventional income and, consequently,
are more willing to save some of it (Beverly et al., 2006).
Advocates for the new IRS policy also stressed that savings bonds are an attractive
savings vehicle for LMI families because they combine broad access to a guaranteed real
return with limited transaction costs and the name recognition and reliability of the federal
government (e.g., Tufano and Schneider, 2005; Cramer et al., 2010). Some early empirical
evidence seemed to conrm that there was extensive, latent demand for savings bonds among
LMI households. Specically, 24 percent of participants in a pilot study of low-income tax
lers reported they would be likely to purchase savings bonds with their tax refund. And,
when savings bonds were described in the survey instrument, the share of respondents who
indicated that they would use their refund to purchase savings bonds increased to 76 percent
(Beverly et al., 2006, page 153).
However, in a subsequent pilot study in which tax lers could direct some of their tax
refunds to savings bonds, the take-up rate was quite low. Specically, during the 2007, 2008,
and 2009 tax-ling seasons, the Doorways to Dreams (D2D) Fund used a special waiver
from the U.S. Department of the Treasury to oer low-income tax lers the opportunity to
purchase Series I U.S. Savings Bonds with their tax refunds (D2D, Inc., 2009). The 2009
pilot study occurred at 67 Volunteer Income Tax Assistance (VITA) sites that served over
50,000 clients. VITA sites are managed by non-prot organizations in cooperation with the
IRS and provide free tax-ling services to low-income clients using tax preparers who have
been trained and certied by the IRS. The tax preparers in these pilot sites also completed
computer-based training about U.S. Savings Bonds, and the participating sites marketed
10U.S. Savings Bonds using bilingual brochures, posters, and leaets. Despite these eorts,
only 6 percent of those eligible to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds during the 2009 tax-ling
season (i.e., a refund of at least $50 and direct deposit) actually did so (D2D Fund, Inc.,
2009, page 13). Those who did purchase U.S. Savings Bonds saved, on average, about $200
(i.e., roughly 10 percent of their tax refund).
Overall, this evidence suggests that there might be a unique role for a \default" nudge in
promoting tax-time savings among low-income households, particularly with respect to the
newly available opportunity to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds. Specically, there is suggestive
pilot evidence that low-income tax lers have a fairly strong intentionality to direct tax
refunds to savings bonds (Beverly et al., 2006) but fail to follow through on this intent in
eld settings (D2D, Inc. 2009). Moreover, the literature on 401(k) savings suggests that
default allocations are particularly eective among lower-income workers (e.g., Choi et al.,
2004). In the next section, we describe a eld experiment in which the role of a default
in promoting the purchase of U.S. Savings Bonds among low-income tax lers was tested
directly.
4 The Savings Bond Experiment
We conducted a randomized eld experiment at eight IRS-sponsored Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance (VITA) sites during the 2010 tax-ling season, the rst year in which the
Obama administration's new policy allowing the purchase of savings bonds with tax refunds
was implemented nationwide. Eligible tax lers at these sites were presented with either
a conventional opportunity to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds with some of their tax refund
(i.e., an \opt-in") or with a scenario in which a xed percentage of their tax refund would
be directed by default to U.S. Savings Bonds unless they actively decided otherwise (i.e., an
11\opt-out").
4.1 Field Setting and Training
The participating VITA sites were located in Delaware and Montgomery counties just
outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (5 sites in Chester and 1 each in Holmes, Media, and
Norristown). Tax lers who had annual household income lower than $50,000 were eligible
to receive free tax-preparation services at these sites. Each client was served by a volunteer
tax preparer who was required to rst complete extensive training and earn IRS certication.
The tax preparers who participated in our study included volunteers from local colleges (i.e.,
Swarthmore College, Bryn Mawr College, and Villanova University) as well as community
volunteers and some employees of our community-partner organizations. Once preparers had
completed the IRS-sponsored training, our research team also directed training sessions in
which tax preparers were educated about both the key features of U.S. Savings Bonds and the
protocol for this study, which is described below. We also complemented this training with
additional site-based oversight and feedback to tax preparers by members of the research
team.
In addition to the training and oversight of the participating tax preparers, we also im-
plemented an informational and marketing campaign similar to those utilized in the previous
pilots (D2D, Inc. 2009). Specically, each VITA site (e.g., waiting areas) was decorated with
posters and with yers, some of which were designed to motivate interest in and comfort
with U.S. Savings Bonds. Others were designed to be informative about the key features of
Series I U.S. Savings Bonds (e.g., the guaranteed rate of return). We also included Spanish-
language versions of some posters.3 Furthermore, we placed one of our most informative
savings bond yers on every tax preparation station so tax lers could read the yer during
3 See Appendix B for pictures of these posters and yers.
12the session and when being asked to make a decision about savings bonds. Each tax preparer
was also provided with a \Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)" sheet that would allow him
to quickly address any queries (Appendix C).
4.2 Study Eligibility and Participants
The VITA tax-ling season began in early February of 2010 and concluded on April 15,
2010. Upon arrival to VITA sites, clients completed an intake procedure that conrmed
their eligibility and that they had the appropriate documentation for completing their taxes.
They would then go to a tax-preparation station (i.e., a desk, cubicle or table, depending
on the site) where a trained volunteer would prepare their taxes using \TaxWise" software.
Near the end of the tax-preparation process, the preparer would make a determination as to
whether the tax ler was eligible for study participation.
Only tax lers who received federal tax refunds of at least $50 were eligible because
that is the smallest denomination of the bonds. Furthermore, by IRS design, only those
respondents receiving their tax refunds through direct deposit were eligible to purchase U.S.
Savings Bonds (and, by implication, eligible for the study). Specically, tax lers interested
in using their refund to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds had to use the form that allowed
\refund-splitting" across direct-deposit accounts.4 Therefore, as in the earlier pilot studies
(D2D, Inc. 2009), the eligible study participants were those using a direct deposit account
to receive a federal tax refund of at least $50.
Table 1 presents data on the observed characteristics of the study participants (n = 259)
4 The IRS implemented the option to purchase savings bonds through Form 8888, which allows a
tax ler to split his or her refund into two or three direct deposit accounts. To purchase savings
bonds with a refund, the tax preparer used a specic IRS routing number and the account number
\BONDS" on this form, treating savings bonds as another direct deposit account. Therefore, only
lers who were receiving the remainder of their refund by direct deposit could purchase U.S. savings
bonds through their IRS tax returns.
13using both the key study data collected as part of the experimental procedures described in
the next section (e.g., federal refund amount and adjusted gross income) and the participant
responses to a \site survey" completed at the conclusion of each tax-preparation session. This
brief survey elicited information about demographic traits (e.g., age, sex, race), educational
attainment, and whether the client had nancial hardship (i.e., trouble with any bills).5 The
results indicate that participants received, on average, federal tax refunds of roughly $1,900,
an amount equal to more than 10 percent of the average AGI of $17,990. The average age
of study participants was 37 years; over 68 percent of the study participants were female
and over 44 percent of study participants identied their race/ethnicity as black.6 Nearly 38
percent of participants identied themselves as having dependents. And, interestingly, the
results in Table 1 indicate that nearly 70 percent stated that they had trouble paying bills
while only 17 percent stated they had plans to save some of their refund.
As with any empirical study, experimental or otherwise, it is useful to consider whether
inferences based on this study population are likely to have broader \external validity." For
example, the participants in this study are a select sample both because they chose to use the
VITA services and because they had to arrive at the participating sites when participating
tax preparers were there. Furthermore, as noted above, the use of direct deposit for receiving
tax refunds was a requirement for having the option to choose U.S. Savings Bonds.
The empirical relevance of concerns like these is perhaps best evaluated through conduct-
ing replication studies with heterogeneous design features and populations. However, several
factors indirectly suggest that our ndings are likely to have broader policy generalizability.
For example, though clients at VITA sites could conceivably respond dierently to policy
5 The response rate to the survey varied by question but was generally in the range of 85 to 90
percent; data on AGI, refund amounts and saving decisions are available for all study participants.
6 Nearly all of the remaining study participants who answered this question self-identied as Cau-
casian rather than Hispanic or Asian so the reference category constructed here is for non-Black
respondents who answered the race/ethnicity question.
14interventions than other low-income tax lers, they are also a uniquely important population
both because of their prevalence and because such settings are likely to be particularly salient
for interventions that seek to exploit the \savable moment."7 Similarly, relying only on tax
lers using direct deposit is a policy-relevant screen because it is a binding requirement for
saving in this important setting. Regardless, it should be noted that the use of direct deposit
in this population is actually quite high (roughly 60% of those receiving refunds), perhaps
because VITA sites strongly encourage its use.
The available data from the participating VITA sites provide another way to examine
this question. For example, using site-level data from the end-of-year reports, we found that
both the average AGI and refunds amounts of the study participants were quite similar to
those of the other VITA clients at these sites.
The detailed site-survey data available from VITA clients who did not participate in the
study provide an additional way to make such comparisons (Table 1). These data indicate
that the study participants were similar to the non-participants with regard to several traits
such as race, the presence of dependents and whether they stated they had trouble paying
bills. However, these comparisons also suggest some notable and statistically signicant dif-
ferences (Table 1). For example, those included in the study tended to be younger, female,
and were more likely to have attended (though not completed) college. These distinctions
could conceivably reect how observables that predict lower-income employment (i.e., com-
parative youth and moderate education) also drive receipt of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), the existence of non-trivial refunds and, by implication, eligibility for purchasing
U.S. Savings Bonds and appearing in this study. Interestingly, the study participants were
also somewhat less likely to le their tax returns during the last few weeks of the tax season
(Table 1). A possible explanation for this dierence is that tax lers anticipating larger
7 During the 2010 tax year, over 3 million tax returns were led at VITA sites (IRS 2010).
15refunds (and, therefore, eligible to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds) tended to le early because
they had some awareness of the likelihood of a meaningful refund and specic intentions for
spending that money. Another way that this study engages issues related to heterogeneity
is by evaluating our treatment estimates among subgroups dened by key observed traits
such as having led late in the season. However, it should be noted that there might be
interesting external-validity issues that are beyond the scope of this study. For example, if
responsiveness to choice defaults is mediated by region-specic cultural norms, results based
on tax lers who are not in or near large, northeastern cities such as Philadelphia may dier.
4.3 Permuted Block Randomization and Treatment Balance
Once clients' tax refunds and study eligibility were determined, tax preparers presented
them with either a control or treatment version of a \Your Refund / Savings Bond Work-
sheet." These worksheets are presented in Appendix A, and their presentation and design is
discussed in detail below. We randomized clients to either the control (i.e. opt-in) or treat-
ment version of the worksheets using a straightforward procedure that could be understood
as a version of the \permuted block" randomization strategies commonly used in clinical
trials in medicine (Schulz and Grimes, 2002). Specically, each tax preparer used a glued
pad of worksheets (Appendix A) that alternated between treatment and control versions.
Preparers were instructed to use the top worksheet for consecutive clients.
This approach ensured that - within each site and day - every consecutive pair of tax
clients would include one treatment and one control (i.e., a permutation between treatment
states within each \block" of 2 consecutive subjects at the same site and at the same time).
We viewed this design feature as an important part of the study because we anticipated a
relatively small sample size and wanted to ensure that these study participants were well
balanced across the two conditions. That is, by varying treatment status within each site on
16a rolling basis throughout the tax-ling season, we sought to balance across treatment and
control conditions the unobserved subject traits that are potential internal-validity threats.
The eectiveness of a random-assignment procedure with respect to balancing unobserved
traits cannot be denitively established. However, an important, ad hoc way of assessing the
performance of a random-assignment procedure is to compare how observed subject traits,
particularly those that inuence the outcomes of interest, are balanced across treatment
states. We provide evidence on this issue in Table 2, which reports the results of auxiliary
regressions in which treatment status is the dependent variable and observed subject traits
are the regressors.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the randomization procedure eectively balanced
subjects across the treatment and control conditions. For example, the F-tests from these
regressions consistently indicate that the observed subject traits are jointly insignicant
determinants of treatment status (i.e., the null hypothesis that R2 = 0 cannot be rejected
in any of these regressions). Furthermore, almost all of the observed subject traits have
statistically insignicant \eects" on treatment status. One exception is that the weakly
signicant relationship suggesting that mid-season lers (March 1 - March 21) were more
likely to receive the treatment worksheet than early lers. However, this relationship would
not be statistically signicant after correcting for multiple comparisons. Furthermore, our
evidence indicates that mid-season lers were not more likely to purchase savings bonds than
early lers so this pattern would not suggest a threat to the internal validity associated with
random assignment.
4.4 The Treatment Contrast
After a client's federal tax refund had been calculated and her eligibility to purchase
U.S. Savings Bonds conrmed, preparers were instructed to introduce the client to the \Your
17Refund / Savings Bond Worksheet" with a simple statement like, \Now that we've calculated
your refund, please review & complete this worksheet on how you will receive your refund.
Let me know if you have any questions." Preparers were specically trained not to mention
savings bonds in their introduction and to hand the worksheet to the ler, allowing the ler
time to complete it.8 If lers had trouble reading or understanding the worksheet, preparers
were trained to simply read through the worksheet with the ler, following the script on the
worksheet. When lers asked specic questions about savings bonds, preparers referred to
a U.S. Series I Savings Bond \Frequently Asked Questions" (FAQ) sheet that was kept at
the tax preparation station (see Appendix C). Preparers were told that they should not give
advice to tax lers, oer a \sales pitch," overemphasize the possibility of opting out of the
default, or inuence a ler's decision about savings in any way. Throughout the tax season,
members of our research team continuously monitored the tax preparation procedures at our
study sites to ensure that tax preparers were implementing the experiment in accordance
with this design.
Exactly how did the treatment and control worksheets dier? In the control version of the
worksheet, the tax ler was presented with her adjusted gross income (AGI), the amount of
her federal tax refund, and a brief introductory statement about U.S. Series I Savings Bonds.
The ler was then instructed to ll out the amount of her refund she wished to direct to
savings bonds, using the following text: \Indicate the amount of U.S. Savings Bonds you
want here. (Enter $0 if no bonds purchased; your amount must be a multiple of $50.)" If
a ler in the control group took no action, the default was that she would purchase zero
savings bonds.
In the treatment version of the savings bond worksheet, the ler was again presented with
8 Tax preparers were also given reminder cards that included this language and some basic reminders
about the experiment protocol. These cards remained at the tax preparation stations for tax
preparers to refer to as needed.
18her AGI, estimated tax refund, and a brief statement about U.S. Savings Bonds. However,
the treatment worksheet also included a small chart, in which an amount of savings bonds,
reecting approximately 10 percent of the tax ler's refund amount, was circled by the tax
preparer. The worksheet instructed the ler that \the circled amount below - approximately
10% of your refund - will be automatically directed to U.S. Series I Savings Bonds in your
name unless you decide to change that amount." Further down the page, the worksheet gave
the ler the opportunity to \opt out" with the following text: (Optional) \If you would want
a dierent amount of U.S. Savings Bonds, indicate the amount here. (Enter $0 if no bonds
purchased; your amount must be a multiple of $50.)"
The fundamental distinction between the treatment and control worksheets involves what
would happen if the ler took no action. Filers who were assigned to the control condition
and took no action purchased no U.S. Savings Bonds. If a ler in the treatment condition
took no action, she would purchase the amount of savings bonds circled in the chart, the
default reecting approximately 10 percent of her refund. However, the default manipulation
did not limit the choice set available to individuals: Tax lers were always free to choose to
receive zero savings bonds (or any other desired amount).
We set the default amount of savings bonds equal to approximately 10 percent of a ler's
refund because savers in the earlier pilot study conducted at VITA sites spent about 10
percent of their refunds on savings bonds (D2D Fund, Inc. 2009). We attempted to prevent
lers from mistakenly perceiving the ~10% default to be 10 percent of income, which might
have discouraged saving. Specically, a ler's AGI and federal refund amount were clearly
listed at the top of his worksheet, and, in the case of treatment-group lers, were followed by
the smaller default amount. Explicitly reminding lers of their incomes and refund amounts
before introducing the ~10% default amount should have reduced the likelihood of mental
accounting biases, whereby lers imagined the default bond contribution as larger than it
19was.
It should also be noted that we took steps to minimize the possibility of treatment con-
tamination; that is, that lers might overhear or see another ler receiving the alternative
presentation of the savings bond decision. First, at many of the VITA sites in our study,
including the two largest sites, tax preparation sessions took place in oce cubicles sepa-
rated by high dividers. At all sites, tax preparation sessions began at staggered times and
took dierent amounts of time to reach the point at which the savings bond decision was
introduced. In addition, we generally observed that tax lers and tax preparers attempted
to enhance the feeling of privacy at the sites by, for example, speaking quietly and referring
to sensitive information on paper rather than aloud. We also instructed tax preparers to
keep the treatment and control materials in a closed folder when not in use. There was
no indication from either tax preparers or clients that clients had perceived the treatment
contrast that was implemented.
5 Results
5.1 Eect of the Default Manipulation on Tax Filers' Savings Bond Purchases
The default manipulation in our study may aect the savings decisions of low-income
tax lers in two key ways. At the extensive margin, the introduction of the default equal to
approximately 10 percent of the ler's refund may increase participation in the savings bond
program. At the intensive margin, the default may increase the amount of bonds purchased
among those who participate.
Table 3 presents evidence on the participation eect. The results shown are from re-
gressions of an indicator for having purchased any savings bonds on treatment status and
a number of controls for observable characteristics that may impact savings decisions. The
20parsimonious model (column 1) includes only controls for the amount of the ler's federal
refund and the ler's AGI. Subsequent models introduce controls for quadratics in the ler's
federal refund amount and AGI (2); basic demographic characteristics like age, gender, and
race, educational attainment, dependents, and ling status (3); site dummies (4); an in-
teraction term for female lers with dependents (5); indicators for having a \high delity
tax preparer" or a preparer who thought savings bonds were a good idea for lers (6); and
dummies for ling mid-season or late in the season (7).9
Regardless of the model, we nd treatment status to have no statistically signicant
eect on the probability that lers in our sample purchase a positive amount of savings
bonds with their refunds.10 Moreover, 95 percent condence intervals around our point
estimates suggest a maximum treatment eect of approximately 8 percentage points, which
is far smaller than the range of estimates from the literature on default eects on savings
participation in the context of 401(k) contributions (see, e.g., Madrian and Shea, 2001, who
report a 50 percentage point increase in participation rates for new hires).11 Our nding that
introducing a default of positive savings has no eect on low-income tax lers' participation
may be surprising in light of the existing literature showing large default eects on savings
decisions in the context of 401(k) contributions among middle-to-upper class workers oered
9 Specically, a \high delity tax preparer" is a preparer who responded to our tax preparer survey
and answered \agree" or \strongly agree" (6 or 7 on a 7-point scale) to the statement, \I prepared
and presented the savings-bond worksheets according to the procedures." Tax preparers who felt
savings bonds were a good idea were those who responded to our tax preparer survey and responded
\agree"or \strongly agree" to the statement, \It is a good idea for lers to put some of their tax
refunds into savings bonds."
10The results from estimation of analogous probit and logit models are qualitatively similar and nd
no signicant eect of treatment status on savings bond participation. These results are available
upon request.
11Savings participation rates in the control condition (9 percent) are also much smaller than par-
ticipation rates induced by \active choice" interventions described in the 401(k) literature. For
example, Carroll et al. (2008) report a 28 percentage point increase in savings participation rela-
tive to the standard opt-in procedure. Thus, our population appears to be less susceptible to such
active-choice interventions.
21401(k) accounts by their employers. We discuss potential explanations for the diering
results below.
We also examine savings decisions at the intensive margin, but again our ndings suggest
no treatment eect. Results from both Tobit and OLS specications show that treatment
status does not signicantly impact the amount of savings bonds purchased, conditional on
participation.12 Moreover, the treatment did not appear to cause lers who saved to be
more likely to choose the \default" amount of savings bonds associated with their refunds
(approximately 10 percent). Indeed, the percentage of treatment-group savers who chose the
default amount of bonds did not dier signicantly from the fraction of control-group savers
who did so.
5.2 Treatment Eect Heterogeneity
While we nd no evidence of a treatment eect on savings bond take-up, the results in
Table 3 indicate that some observable characteristics do predict savings bond participation
among low-income tax lers in our sample. For example, our estimates suggest that having a
larger federal refund increases the likelihood of purchasing savings bonds; the coecient on
the square of the federal refund amount is negative, suggesting concavity in this relationship.
Black lers in our sample were about 10 percentage points more likely to buy savings bonds
with their refund, while being a female with dependents increased the likelihood of savings
bond take-up by about 18-20 percentage points. Filers who had a tax preparer that reported
feeling that savings bonds were a good idea for lers were about 9-10 percentage points more
likely to buy savings bonds.
Finally, those who led during the last 3 weeks of tax season were signicantly more
likely to buy savings bonds than those who led during the rst four weeks of the season.
12These results are available from the authors upon request.
22This may suggest that late lers did not have the same pressing needs as early lers to spend
their refund paying bills or reducing debt and thus were more able to save. Therefore, while
the default manipulation had no eect on savings, it was not the case that savings decisions
at tax ling time were completely insensitive to characteristics or situation (see also Duo et
al. (2006), for evidence that nancial incentives can induce saving a portion of tax refunds).
That savings bond participation is predicted by ler characteristics like refund amount,
race, motherhood, time of ling, and tax preparer traits suggests possible heterogeneity in
treatment eects. For instance, the default manipulation may increase savings among certain
subgroups of taxpayers, such as those who le late in the season or those with large refunds.
Accordingly, in Table 4 we present estimated treatment eects for various subgroups
of low-income tax lers, splitting our sample rst by ler traits, including race, gender,
dependents, education, ling status, AGI (greater than or less than median), refund amount
(greater than or less than median), whether lers reported currently having trouble with any
bills, and whether lers had their taxes prepared by the same VITA site in the previous year.
These results are displayed in the top panel of Table 4 and are consistent with our previous
ndings. Again, we nd no evidence of a treatment eect among any of these subgroups of
lers, nor do we nd signicant dierences in the estimated eect of the treatment across
relevant subgroups.13
Next, we consider whether treatment eects diered among clients in our sample de-
pending on when in the tax season they led. We nd no statistically signicant treatment
eect among lers who led early in the tax season (during the month of February), midway
through the season (between March 1st and March 21st), or late in the season (March 22nd
through April 15th). However, recall from Table 3 that clients who le late (in the last 3
weeks of tax season) are more likely to purchase savings bonds than those who le early in
13The results are qualitatively unchanged when we estimate regressions that include interactions
between the treatment and the relevant characteristics using the full sample of 259 observations.
23the tax season. In short, while intentions to save (spend) appear to be stronger among late
(early) lers, our default manipulation does not \nudge" late lers to save more often.
Finally, perhaps the default increased savings bond participation among lers who had
a certain type of tax preparer. Similar results have been found in other experiments imple-
mented by tax preparers during tax preparation sessions (see, e.g., Chetty and Saez, 2009,
or Duo et al., 2006). Moreover, our initial results suggested that having a tax preparer who
reported feeling that savings bonds were a good idea for lers raised the probability a ler
bought savings bonds by about 9-10 percentage points. If these tax preparers implemented
the experiment with the desired treatment-control contrast while other tax preparers did
not, we may nd a treatment eect among lers who were served by these \enthusiastic"
preparers.
The bottom panel of Table 4 displays estimated eects of the ~10% default on savings
bond participation among tax lers with preparers who responded to our preparer survey,
who felt condent that they followed the experimental protocol, or who were enthusiastic
about savings bonds as being a good idea for low-income tax lers.14 Because lers may
have been more likely to trust an implicit recommendation from a non-student tax preparer,
the nal two rows compare estimated treatment eects for lers served by student and non-
student tax preparers. Once again our evidence suggests that the default manipulation had
no signicant impact on savings participation decisions among low-income tax lers, even
those served by high-quality, enthusiastic, or non-student tax preparers.
In short, our results indicate that the default manipulation in our experiment had no
discernable impact on low-income tax lers' savings decisions. Moreover, 95 percent con-
dence intervals around our key treatment eect estimates (in Table 3) suggest that the
14Recall that this last subgroup of preparers responded \agree" or \strongly agree" (6 or 7 on a
7-point scale) to the statement, \It is a good idea for lers to put some of their refunds into savings
bonds."
24treatment raised savings bond participation by no more than approximately 8 percentage
points. That is, the upper bound on our estimate of the treatment eect is far smaller than
the estimated default eects on savings participation found in the 401(k) literature. We
compare our default manipulation to those in the literature on 401(k) defaults below.
5.3 Comparing the Savings-Bond and 401(k) Defaults
The default manipulation in this study incorporated two features thought to be important
for defaults to inuence behavior. First, there was an implicit recommendation to save 10
percent of the refund in the treatment condition, while there was no specic recommendation
in the control condition. The recommendation aspect of default interventions is thought to
inuence behavior, by lowering decision costs: To the extent that people avoid saving due to
the decision costs associated with choosing how much to save, the recommendation lowers
costs and works in the direction of increasing saving. Second, the passive decision in the
treatment condition was buying bonds, whereas the passive decision in the control condition
was to buy no bonds. To the extent that the decision costs|cognitive and psychological (e.g.,
regret)|are lower for passive decisions than for active decisions, the treatment condition
should favor buying bonds relative to the control condition.
However, there are some noteworthy dierences between our default intervention, and the
main type of default intervention considered in prior 401(k) studies of defaults. One dierence
is the size of the savings default, which is relatively low in our intervention. Specically,
because U.S. Series I Savings Bonds must be bought in multiples of $50, the default amount
actually reected 10 percent of a ler's refund rounded down to the nearest multiple of $50.
The average default bond amount in our sample actually reected only 6.5 percent of the tax
refund and only 1.1 percent of adjusted gross income. In contrast, the default contribution
rate in 401(k) studies is typically at least 2 to 3 percent of income and, in two prominent
25studies, 6 percent of income (Choi et al., 2002 and 2004). The relatively low default amount
in our study would seem to have made the default more palatable for subjects and enhanced
the potential treatment eect, all else equal.
Another dierence between our treatment contrast and those in 401(k) defaults is the
source of the implicit recommendation. In our study the recommendation was presented
on an ocial-looking form, and could have been interpreted as coming from either the tax
assistance organization, or possibly the IRS. Having the recommendation delivered by form,
rather than verbally by the tax preparer, made clear to subjects that the recommendation
was not from the individual tax preparer. In contrast, the defaults in 401(k) studies were
set by employers, and thus the recommendation was from employers. It is not clear whether
the advice of tax advice organizations, or an employer, should be more or less authoritative.
What is clear is that our subjects came to the non-prot organizations seeking help, and
thus they should have been particularly open to receiving advice, if anything, potentially
enhancing the power of the default.
One dierence that could have weakened the power of our default was the perhaps more
limited scope for procrastination compared to the 401(k) setting. In the case of automatic
enrollment in 401(k) plans, individuals knew that they could always change their mind about
their savings contribution rate by making a phone call (Madrian and Shea, 2001). To the
extent that individuals are na ve hyperbolic discounters, they might anticipate making this
change, but always put o making the call to the future. This phone call option tends to
make the default seem less binding ex ante, and might enhance participation, while in fact
procrastination ensures that the default is very binding. In our setting, by contrast, indi-
viduals made a one-time decision to save some of their refund, with no explicit opportunity
to change their mind later. This might have made the default seem more binding, and
discouraged participation, all else equal. On the other hand, the decision was binding only
26regarding the current refund, and not next year's refund, and as discussed above, the savings
rate was relatively low, both of which would have worked in the other direction, making the
default seem like less of a commitment.15
One other possible concern about the treatment contrast in this study is noteworthy.
Our impact estimates could, in theory, understate the true eect of the default if the control
condition also constituted a type of treatment that encouraged savings participation. In
particular, the control worksheet compelled the attention of participating subjects to the
savings decision. The \ne print" in the instructions asked the subjects to write zero if
they wanted no bonds. This was a stipulation of the VITA administrators, who wanted it
to be clear that zero was an option. However, if these control conditions caused subjects
to feel they had to make an active decision to buy zero bonds, as opposed to passively
going with zero, it might be expected to have enhanced savings participation. As shown
by Carroll et al. (2009), forcing 401(k) holders to actively choose between zero or positive
savings contributions rates increased savings participation rates (although substantially less
than the standard intervention of making positive saving the default). Since going with the
default in our treatment condition did not require writing anything on the worksheet at all,
the decision costs of choosing a positive savings amount were still lower in the treatment
condition than control. However, an active-decision aspect to the control condition would
have worked in the direction of reducing the treatment contrast. In light of our results, the
empirical relevance of this concern is quite limited. More specically, consider the extreme
case where all of the savings participation in the control condition was actually due to the
hypothesized active-decision nature of the control worksheet. Under this scenario, the true
impact of the default treatment (i.e., relative to a genuinely inert control condition in which
15To the extent that individuals are sophisticated hyperbolic discounters (see Laibson, 1997;
O'donogue and Rabin, 1999), one might expect that a more binding commitment would make
the default even more attractive.
27no one saves) would simply be the mean savings-participation rate among those assigned to
the default treatment (i.e., roughly 9 percent). This upper bound on our impact estimate
is still a fraction (i.e., no more than 20 percent) of the default-participation eects found in
401(k) studies and, therefore, consistent with our main ndings in suggesting some possible
limitations on the eects of defaults.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
Our study is the rst to try a default manipulation as a way to inuence savings decisions
of low-income tax lers. More generally, ours is one of the few to investigate how defaults
aect savings behavior, outside of the particular setting of decisions about 401(k) contri-
butions. Thus, our experiment provides an opportunity to see whether the large impact of
default interventions in the previous literature generalize to other, policy relevant settings.
The fact that we nd no discernible eect of the default manipulation raises questions about
the power of defaults for dierent populations and the mechanisms underlying default ef-
fects. In this section, we discuss potential explanations for the contrasting results, drawing
on ancillary evidence from our surveys of tax lers and tax preparers.
In our survey of tax preparers, we asked about several potential reasons for the weak
eect of the treatment, and one explanation emerged as the clear favorite: 79 percent of
preparers observed that lers seemed to resist the savings default due to strong prior plans
to use the refund for consumption (see Table 5). Our survey of tax lers provides corrobo-
rating evidence, indicating that 75% of lers had the expectation that they would spend the
refund. As argued in Section 5, the savings default was suciently low that going with the
default should have been nancially feasible. However, the decision-cost advantages of going
with the default may have been oset by the psychological costs associated with deviating
28from pre-existing plans. A large body of evidence documents the tendency for people to
dislike inconsistency with the status quo, or previously held expectations.16 In fact, default
interventions are argued to work partly because they establish a particular status quo, and
thus harness status quo bias (Camerer et al., 2003). However, pre-existing plans would tend
to create a competing status quo, which could undermine the power of the default manipu-
lation. The fact that going with the default entailed the psychological cost of deviation from
previous plans would also have \raised the stakes" of the decision, making it more likely that
individuals felt the need to make an active, deliberative choice when considering the default.
Having already incurred the xed costs of making an active decision, individuals would have
found the default even less attractive.
In short, a nudge is not a shove. Indeed, 401(k) defaults may be powerful precisely be-
cause they coincide with the pre-existing intentions to save of relatively auent individuals.
Previous studies argue that 401(k) holders want to save for retirement, but have trouble
actually initiating savings contributions, due to uncertainty about the optimal contribu-
tion, the decision costs associated with guring this out, and the tendency to procrastinate
(Madrian and Shea, 2001). The default can thus improve welfare, by providing an implicit
recommendation, and lowering the decision costs of choosing a specic savings contribution
rate, while moving behavior in a direction that is consistent with previous intentions. To
the extent that the default does coincide with intentions of 401(k) holders, this avoids the
problem that arises when defaults clash with pre-existing plans.
Our ndings oer an important caveat to the common assumption that defaults should
have an especially powerful impact on low-income populations. Due to less sophistication,
and greater uncertainty, in nancial matters, as well as potentially higher decision costs, it
16People tend to be \loss averse" with respect to the status quo, or expectations, which means they
dislike deviating from these reference points. See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Samuelson
and Zeckhauser (1988), Koszegi and Rabin (2006), and Abeler et al. (forthcoming).
29has been argued that low-income individuals should be highly susceptible to the implicit
recommendation and decision-cost reducing aspects of default interventions, all else equal
(Bertrand et al.,2006). However, all else may not be equal, in terms of intentions, or expec-
tations, to save. To the extent that low-income lers do not have strong intentions to save
at tax time, defaults may have little eect. One implication is that default interventions
aimed at low-income populations might need to be augmented with ex ante eorts to shift
expectations.
In this regard it is noteworthy that the survey-based pilot survey discussed above (Beverly
et al., 2006, page 153) found that a large fraction of low-income tax lers, roughly 75 percent,
expressed an interest in buying savings bonds. This might seem to indicate a strong intention
to save, but in fact a much lower fraction, only about 6 percent, actually purchased bonds in
a subsequent study conducted at tax time with real savings decisions (D2D Fund, Inc., 2009,
page 13). Thus, intentions to save seemed to be weak at the moment of tax ling, similar
to our ndings. One interpretation is that the expressed interest in savings bonds found by
the survey study was partly driven by experimenter demand, and many subjects overstated
their willingness to buy savings bonds in the future. However, an alternative interpretation
could be that there is a dierence between plans to buy bonds in the more distant future,
and intentions to buy in the present. Although speculative, this would imply that the source
of strong intentions to spend the tax refund at tax time could partly be high short-run
discount rates, which dier from lower, long-term discount rates in the sense of hyperbolic
discounting (see, e.g., O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). If hyperbolic discounting were more
prevalent in low-income populations, this could be a reason why low-income populations are
more dicult to nudge.
There are also other potential explanations for why default eects were weak for our
specic population. Although viewed as less important than lers having plans to spend,
30preparers indicated that unfamiliarity with savings bonds may have limited the impact of
the treatment (see Table 5). It is hard to say with certainty whether our subject population
had a much worse understanding of bonds than 401(k) holders had of the properties of those
accounts. The informational campaign, including the stand-up yer on the tax-preparer's
desk, should have helped improve understanding. However, to the extent that discomfort
with relatively simple and attractive savings assets like bonds makes low-income individuals
resistant to defaults, this is an important caveat regarding the policy relevance of defaults
for low-income populations.
Another possibility is that increasing savings using defaults was simply not feasible for
members of the treatment group, due to nancial constraints. To the extent that individuals
were so constrained, or at least perceived themselves to be so constrained, this would have
clashed strongly with the default intervention. Similar to having plans to spend, a feeling
of being constrained could have meant that taking the default entailed substantial decision
costs, and thus that it did not provide a path of least resistance. This would have undermined
the ability of the default to inuence decisions. Previous evidence, however, suggests that
even low-income tax lers probably have some scope for increasing savings, for example if
given sucient inducement in the form of a matching grant (Duo et al., 2006).
As discussed above in Section 5, there are also some dierences between our default
intervention and the interventions used in the 401(k) setting, most notably the scope for
procrastination. In our setting, people had to make a one-time decision about how much of
their refund to save, rather than having the option to change their mind later. On the other
hand, there was no commitment for next year's refund, and the commitment is smaller in
percentage terms than the typical 401(k) default. In other words, the dierence seems to
be whether there is a month-long commitment of 6% of income, or a yearlong commitment
of 1.1% of income. If this dierence explains the contrasting results, then it indicates that
31incorporating a procrastination element is crucial, something that is important to take into
account when designing policy.
In summary, our ndings raise important questions about the applicability, and optimal
design, of default interventions for policy measures. Further research is needed to assess the
power of defaults for dierent populations, and to open the black box of the mechanisms
behind default eects.
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34Figure 1: Savings Bond Participation among Control and Treatment Groups
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Variable
Federal Refund Amount ($) 1905.60 -----
(2013.90)
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) ($) 17990.3 ------
(14382.40)
Amount of Savings Bonds Purchased ($) 9.27 ------
(37.497)
Any Savings Bonds Purchased? 0.093 ------
(0.291)
Female 0.683 0.562 0.0008
(0.466) (0.497)
Sex Missing 0.085 0.110 0.2604
(0.279) (0.313)
Age 36.9 41.3 0.0067
(21.6) (22.4)
Age Missing 0.131 0.117 0.5433
(0.338) (0.321)
Black 0.444 0.490 0.209
(0.498) (0.500)
Race Missing 0.108 0.126 0.4532
(0.311) (0.332)
Any Dependents 0.378 0.356 0.5335
(0.486) (0.479)
Any Dependents Missing 0.139 0.149 0.7140
(0.347) (0.356)
HS Dropout/Education Missing 0.154 0.188 0.2292
(0.362) (0.391)
HS/GED Completer 0.375 0.462 0.0174
(0.485) (0.499)
Some College/Associate's Degree 0.363 0.252 0.0008
(0.482) (0.435)
Bachelors Degree 0.108 0.097 0.6317
(0.311) (0.297)
Filing Status Single 0.571 0.605 0.3489
(0.496) (0.489)
Filing Status Missing 0.120 0.126 0.7898
(0.325) (0.332)
Early Filer (2/1 - 2/28) 0.375 0.319 0.1150
(0.485) (0.467)
Mid-season Filer (3/1 - 3/21) 0.386 0.297 0.0010
(0.488) (0.457)
Late Filer (3/22 - 4/15) 0.239 0.332 0.0063
(0.428) (0.471)
Having Trouble with Any Bills? (N=207, 586) 0.691 0.688 0.9301
(0.463) (0.464)
Plans to Save Some of Refund (N=107, 138) 0.168 0.119 0.2710
(0.376) (0.324)
Number of Observations 259 675
Table 1:  Mean Characteristics of Low-Income Tax Filers at Study VITA Sites
Filers Included in 
Study
Filers Not Included 
in Study
P-values on t test that 
means are equal
Notes: Filers were eligible for the study if they had positive federal refunds greater than $50 and were using direct deposit to
receive their refunds. Filers were not included in the study if they were ineligible (i.e., did not have refunds greater than $50 or
were not using direct deposit) or if they were served by a preparer who was not trained to participate.  37
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable
Federal Refund (1000s) 0.0175 -0.0273 -0.0301 -0.0333 -0.0328 -0.0300 -0.0425 -0.0383
(0.0157) (0.0353) (0.0420) (0.0432) (0.0434) (0.0438) (0.0434) (0.0441)
Federal Refund (1000s) Squared 0.0048 0.0049 0.0050 0.0051 0.0046 0.0057 0.0051
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041)
AGI (1000s) -0.0015 0.0049 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
AGI (1000s) Squared -0.0001
(0.0001)
Female -0.0001 -0.0322 -0.0224 -0.0404 -0.0351 -0.0464
(0.0787) (0.0850) (0.1034) (0.0863) (0.0847) (0.1056)
Age -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0005
(0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Black 0.0415 0.0466 0.0466 0.0419 0.0566 0.0524
(0.0678) (0.0714) (0.0716) (0.0720) (0.0714) (0.0721)
Any Dependents 0.1125 0.1288 0.1513 0.1333 0.1372 0.1444
(0.0922) (0.0963) (0.1660) (0.0970) (0.0960) (0.1674)
HS/GED Completer -0.1104 -0.1358 -0.1368 -0.1357 -0.1352 -0.1335
(0.1230) (0.1262) (0.1266) (0.1271) (0.1257) (0.1270)
Some College/Associates Degree -0.1068 -0.1435 -0.1433 -0.1471 -0.1545 -0.1608
(0.1266) (0.1314) (0.1317) (0.1324) (0.1311) (0.1322)
Bachelors Degree -0.1052 -0.1127 -0.1153 -0.1189 -0.1573 -0.1666
(0.1496) (0.1532) (0.1543) (0.1541) (0.1548) (0.1568)
Filing Status Single 0.0775 0.0817 0.0821 0.0904 0.0607 0.0699
(0.0850) (0.0870) (0.0872) (0.0882) (0.0875) (0.0887)
Female with Dependents -0.0301 -0.0006
(0.1803) (0.1830)
High Fidelity Tax Preparer 0.0873 0.1118
(0.1061) (0.1067)
Preparer: Bonds a Good Idea -0.0087 -0.0004
(0.0824) (0.0824)
Mid-season Filer (3/1 - 3/21) 0.1540* 0.1637**
(0.0796) (0.0815)
Late Filer (3/22 - 4/15) 0.0691 0.0750
(0.0909) (0.0929)
Site Dummies? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
R-squared 0.0057 0.0174 0.0368 0.0458 0.0459 0.0489 0.0609 0.0656
F-test 0.7332 1.1260 0.5779 0.4903 0.4691 0.4589 0.6047 0.5542
Prob > F 0.4814 0.3447 0.8990 0.9775 0.9849 0.9898 0.9325 0.9703
Table 2:  Treatment-Control Balance
(Results from regressions of treatment status on observables; standard errors in parentheses)
Notes: Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All regressions
include controls for missing age, gender, race, filing status, dependent information and missing preparer data, where applicable. 38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable
Treatment -0.0054 0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0051 -0.0043 -0.0076 -0.0066 -0.0093
(0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0361)
Federal Refund (1000s) 0.0208** 0.0582*** 0.0460* 0.0457* 0.0421* 0.0429* 0.0471* 0.0411*
(0.0091) (0.0204) (0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0244) (0.0241)
Federal Refund (1000s) Squared -0.0044** -0.0039* -0.0040* -0.0041* -0.0037 -0.0039* -0.0037
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
AGI (1000s) -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0010
(0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
AGI (1000s) Squared 5.320e-06
(4.550e-05)
Female 0.0134 0.0113 -0.0551 0.0159 0.0085 -0.0599
(0.0446) (0.0478) (0.0576) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0577)
Age -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0009
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Black 0.1020*** 0.1170*** 0.1169*** 0.1137*** 0.1221*** 0.1202***
(0.0385) (0.0402) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0402) (0.0395)
Any Dependents 0.0126 0.0209 -0.1320 0.0264 0.0199 -0.1361
(0.0525) (0.0543) (0.0926) (0.0537) (0.0542) (0.0916)
HS/GED Completer 0.0133 -0.0058 0.0012 -0.0170 -0.0047 -0.0070
(0.0699) (0.0711) (0.0707) (0.0703) (0.0708) (0.0696)
Some College/Assoc. Degree 0.0058 -0.0178 -0.0191 -0.0283 -0.0173 -0.0310
(0.0719) (0.0740) (0.0735) (0.0732) (0.0739) (0.0725)
Bachelors Degree -0.0175 -0.0296 -0.0115 -0.0408 -0.0215 -0.0145
(0.0850) (0.0861) (0.0860) (0.0852) (0.0872) (0.0859)
Filing Status Single -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0022 0.0028 -0.0020
(0.0483) (0.0490) (0.0487) (0.0488) (0.0492) (0.0485)
Female with Dependents 0.2040** 0.2172**
(0.1004) (0.1000)




Mid-season Filer (3/1 - 3/21) 0.0192 0.0304
(0.0451) (0.0449)
Late Filer (3/22 - 4/15) 0.0939* 0.1102**
(0.0511) (0.0508)
Site Dummies? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 259 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
R-squared 0.0216 0.0379 0.0895 0.1155 0.1309 0.1497 0.1289 0.1804
Table 3:  Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation Among Low-Income Tax Filers
Preparer: Bonds a Good Idea
Notes: Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All regressions include
controls for missing age, gender, race, filing status, dependent information, and preparer survey data, where applicable. 39
Estimated  Standard  Number of 
Treatment Effect Error Observations
By Filer Traits:
(1) Full Sample -0.0051 (0.0366) 259
(2) Black 0.0131 (0.0748) 115
(3) Not Black -0.0270 (0.0381) 144
(4) Female 0.0016 (0.0486) 177
(5) Male 0.0455 (0.0600) 82
(6) Dependents -0.0285 (0.0754) 98
(7) No Dependents 0.0217 (0.0408) 161
(8) High School or Less 0.0198 (0.0630) 114
(9) Some College or More 0.0227 (0.0732) 94
(10) Single Filer 0.0067 (0.0493) 148
(11) Not a Single Filer 0.0123 (0.0638) 111
(12) AGI < Median -0.0484 (0.0531) 129
(13) AGI > Median 0.0118 (0.0580) 129
(14) Refund < Median 0.0265 (0.0514) 129
(15) Refund > Median 0.0304 (0.0604) 129
(16) Bill Trouble 0.0527 (0.0506) 143
(17) No Bill Trouble -0.0117 (0.0722) 64
(18) Taxes Prepared Here Last Year 0.0188 (0.0602) 93
(19) Taxes Prepared Somewhere Else Last Year -0.0015 (0.0489) 166
By Time of  Filing:
(20) Filed Early in the Season (February 1-28) 0.0809 (0.0550) 97
(21) Filed Midway through the Season (March 1-21) -0.0191 (0.0653) 100
(22) Filed Late in the Season (March 22-April 15) -0.1092 (0.1116) 62
By Preparer Traits:
(23) Preparer Responded to Survey -0.0245 (0.0458) 197
(24) High Fidelity Tax Preparer -0.0096 (0.0541) 154
(25) Thought Bonds Were a Good Idea  -0.0633 (0.0674) 124
(26) Preparer Was a Student Volunteer -0.0390 (0.0703) 109
(27) Preparer Was a Non-student Volunteer 0.0069 (0.0693) 88
Table 4:  Effect of Default on Savings Bond Participation Among Low-Income Tax Filers,
by Filer and Preparer Characteristics
Notes: Results from LPM/OLS regressions; standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). All regressions
take the form of model (4) in Table 3. That is, they include controls for federal refund amount and its square, AGI, gender,
age, race, education, filing status, dependents, and site dummies. Each regression also includes controls for missing age,
gender, race, filing status, or dependent information.40
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Notes: 58 preparer responses are weighted by the number of filers for whom they prepared taxes. Preparers were
asked, "Please indicate how important each of the following factors was, in your opinion, in explaining why filers
were sometimes reluctant to buy bonds." Possible responses were "Not at all important," "A little important,"
"Somewhat important," "Important," or "Very Important."
Filers did not have enough experience with saving to evaluate the 
attractiveness of the interest rate offered by bonds.
Table 5:  Tax Preparers' Impressions of Why Filers Were Sometimes Reluctant to Buy Bonds
Percentage who thought reason was 
"important" or "very important."
Filers did not know enough about bonds, or understand bonds 
well enough, to feel comfortable buying them.
Filers had specific plans for how to spend their refund, and 
thus did not save.
Filers were not opposed to saving, but did not like bonds because 
in the short run (the first year) they would not be able to access the 
funds if they wanted to.Appendix A (Control Worksheet)
41Appendix A (Treatment Worksheet)
42Appendix B
43Appendix C
44